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Abstract
This article illuminates the ideational foundations of China's 'large enterprise 
strategy', an early experiment in China's efforts to employ industrial policy 
to cultivate a group of state-controlled business groups. Based on archival 
research, the author argues that Chinese policymakers believed the develop-
ment of state-owned large enterprises would bring several kinds of beneﬁts, 
both economic and political. Drawing eclectically from Marxian economics 
and the history of capitalist development in East Asia, they argued that large 
enterprises could serve as both engines of domestic development and as 
safeguards and vanguards in the context of China's re-entry to the global mar-
ketplace. These enterprise groups were also seen as key elements in a market-
conforming model of state control that senior ofﬁcials began to envision and 
plan for as early as the late 1980s. The archival documents also shed light on 
internal debate in the 1980s and 1990s about the pros and cons of promoting 
monopolies, the substance of which anticipates much of the current heated 
discussion about China's 'monopoly industries' (longduan hangye垄断行业). 
Keywords: China, large enterprise strategy, ideas, state-owned enterprises, monopoly
Introduction
I am sure that the power of vested interests is vastly exaggerated, compared 
with the gradual encroachment of ideas. Not, indeed, immediately, but 
after a certain interval; for in the ﬁeld of economic and political philosophy 
there are not many who are inﬂuenced by new theories after they are 
twenty-ﬁve or thirty years of age, so that the ideas which civil servants 
and politicians, and even agitators apply to current events are not likely 
to be the newest. But, soon or late, it is ideas, not vested interests, which 
are dangerous for good or evil. 
J.M. Keynes, 
The General Theory of Employment, 
Interest, and Money, 
[1936]1997: 383-384
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The last decade has seen a marked increase in scholarship employing 
the tools of interest group analysis to explain policy outcomes in China 
(e.g. Kennedy 2005a; Steinberg and Shih 2012; Yang and Li 2008). This 
is undoubtedly a sign of progress in the study of Chinese political 
economy. With greatly improved access to archival materials as well 
as interview subjects, scholars researching interest groups have signiﬁ-
cantly advanced the painstaking work of prying open the black box of the 
Chinese state. Unsurprisingly, the state sector has been the focus of much 
of this recent work (Brødsgaard 2012; Li 2011). In the context of vigorous 
public debate about the 'advance of the state and retreat of the private 
sector' (guojin mintui国进民退), as well as ever-louder calls to 'break' 
state monopolies (dapo longduan打破垄断)in industries dominated by 
behemoth central state-owned enterprises (SOEs) (yangqi央企), there is 
considerable practical and academic value in rigorous scholarship that 
can connect the dots between the policy preferences of powerful players 
in the state sector and actual policy outcomes. 
Yet, we should not lose sight of the fact that politics is about much 
besides interests. In the category of 'other' factors, ideas, in particular, 
loom large. While it is true that more than thirty years of reform have 
created a more 'porous' state (Kennedy 2005b), the People's Republic 
of China (PRC) remains a steadfastly authoritarian polity in which a 
relatively small number of people wield enormous power over the 
national policy agenda. It is in no way naïve to suppose that the ideas 
such policymakers have about the world around them shape their de-
cision-making. As Blyth (2002: 32) argued in his path-breaking study, 
ideas 'are important because without having ideas as to how the world 
is put together, it would be cognitively impossible for agents to act in 
that world in any meaningful sense.' To date, students of Chinese re-
form-era political economy have largely neglected consideration of what 
China's reform-era policymakers actually believe about how economies 
function and how government ought to position itself in relation to the 
economy. A notable exception is Heilmann and Shih's (2013) excellent 
study of the political and ideational factors behind China's embrace of 
industrial policy. In exchanges with the current crop of China's elite 
industrial policymakers, the authors 'encountered ways of conceiving 
economic policies that proved to be quite different from widely shared 
views in Western media and research communities' (2013: 5). 
This article adds to the literature on the ideational foundations of Chi-
na's emerging market order (e.g. Heilmann and Shih 2013; Steinfeld 2006; 
Pearson 2005). Its particular focus is the set of ideas behind China's 'large 
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enterprise strategy' (variously referred to in documents and studies as 
da qiye jituan zhanlüe 大企业集团战略 and sometimes as da gongsi zhanlüe 
大公司战略 or da jituan zhanlüe 大集团战略). Analysis is based largely 
on the author's collection of dozens of internal (neibu内部) government 
documents and analyses drawn from an issue-by-issue review of Jingji 
Yanjiu Cankao Ziliao (Reference Materials for Economic Research), Neibu 
Wengao (Internal Manuscripts) and Gaige Neican (Internal Documents on 
Reform) between 1985 and 2002.1 The primary advantage of using these 
neibu materials to study the ideas behind the large enterprise strategy is 
that, because the intended audience for these pieces consisted of other 
ofﬁcials and scholar-ofﬁcials, their 'political colour' (zhengzhi secai 政治
色彩) is much less strong than documents written for public consump-
tion. Indeed, these documents have much to reveal about the various 
economic and political functions that policymakers hoped state-owned 
large enterprises would serve. 
The Large Enterprise Strategy: Aims and Policies
The large enterprise group strategy developed out of early reform-era 
policy experimentation aimed at improving China's productive capac-
ity in industry.2 The immediate precursor to the large enterprise group 
strategy was the 'horizontal economy' (hengxiang jingji横向经济) initia-
tive (Zhou 1995: 2). Policymakers hoped to partially liberate industrial 
production from the constraints of the tiao kuai (条块) administrative 
system by encouraging enterprises in different segments of industry 
and in different regions to form alliances with one another. In a 1985 
People's Daily editorial, the horizontal economy was described as a criti-
cal element of correcting 'overcentralization and rigidity' in industry as 
well as laying the groundwork for an economic system more in tune 
with the global economy:
[Under the command economy] everybody was 'eating from the common 
pot'—enterprises relied on the state, employees relied on enterprises. This 
became the common feature of the vertical management structure. To 
overcome this fault, we must, in urban reform, ﬁrmly open the doors not only 
externally [to the world] but also internally [between enterprises], to facilitate 
all kinds of horizontal economic integration and afﬁliation among enterprises, 
eradicate the closely conﬁned, rigid vertical management structure of the 
past, and gradually establish an economic structure characterized by open, 
multilateral economic networks. (Tong and Song 1986: 27)
In its early phases, the large enterprise group strategy (qiye jituan 
zhanlüe企业集团战略) really served as an extension of these efforts to 
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dismantle the Mao-era system. In the mid-1980s, Ma Hong from the 
State Council Development Research Centre (SCDRC) took the lead 
in a dialogue with industry leaders in the automobile sector chaﬁng 
under the constraints imposed by a massive bureaucracy that touched 
on every aspect of their business. On the basis of recommendations 
outlined in an SCDRC report, in 1987, the State Council formally 
designated Dongfeng Motor Company (dongfeng qiche gongsi东风汽车
公司) a 'discrete planning unit' (jihua danlie 计划单列), which meant 
a signiﬁcant repositioning in the planning system. Instead of taking 
their marching orders from an industrial line ministry, Dongfeng was 
under the direct authority of the central State Planning Commission 
(SPC); it was hoped that elimination of this one especially thick layer 
of bureaucracy would enhance the automaker's 'enterprise autonomy'. 
The same privilege was gradually extended to a small number of other 
manufacturing enterprises in the late 1980s. 
In the conservative political atmosphere that followed the Tiananmen 
crisis, Premier Li Peng emerged as a powerful champion of the large 
enterprise group strategy. Li's support stood in some contrast to the 
views of his predecessor, Zhao Ziyang, whom Ma Hong (1989: 2) had 
publicly criticized for 'not attach[ing] importance to large enterprises 
and not support[ing] their development and technological transforma-
tion' while 'g[iving] TVEs special privileges'. As part of an omnibus SOE 
reform program, the State Council announced, in September 1991, that 
100 enterprises were to be selected as 'pilot' large enterprise groups. 
Pilot enterprises would be accorded jihua danlie status and would be 
supported by the state through other measures including expansion of 
import/export rights and provision of preferential loans. The initial 55 
pilot enterprises were selected in protracted negotiations between the 
industrial line ministries and the SPC as well as the State Commission for 
Restructuring Economic Systems (SCRES). In 1997, a further 63 enterprise 
groups were added to the ranks of the trial enterprises, which collectively 
had come to be known as the 'national team' (guojia dui国家队).
While there are a number of careful studies of the successes and fail-
ures of the large enterprise strategy in the ﬁeld of economics (Sutherland 
2003; Sutherland and Guest 2010; Nolan 2001), there is little work ex-
ploring the ideational underpinnings of these initiatives. Without such 
knowledge, it is difﬁcult to approach questions of central importance, 
namely why did Chinese policymakers embrace the large enterprise strat-
egy? What did they hope to achieve? Of course, ideas are far from the 
only determinants of political decision-making; interests were certainly 
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germane to the development of large state-owned enterprises in Chinese 
industry (e.g. Eaton 2013). And yet, ideas are not always simply cloaks 
for interest. In the remainder of the article, the ideas behind the 'gradual 
encroachment' of the large enterprise group strategy are explored.   
Products and Engines of Development
Internal documents show that proponents of the large enterprise strategy 
advanced theoretically eclectic, but relatively consistent views about the 
beneﬁts of large enterprises for China's economic development. Several 
early contributions outlining the case for industrial policy in support of 
large enterprise development drew from the Marxian concept of 'mo-
nopoly capitalism' in characterizing large enterprises as the 'inevitable 
product' (biran chanwu 必然产物) of capitalist development (Sun 1987: 
4). One document, written by an ofﬁcial from the SCRES—the central 
bureaucracy with primary responsibility for large enterprise experi-
mentation in the late 1980s—argued that the path charted by advanced 
capitalist countries could, indeed should, serve as inspiration for China's 
reform pathway: 
When capitalism experienced large-scale production and the centralization 
of capital, namely after the merger of enterprises, the transition from free 
competition to monopoly was realized. This period produced short-term price 
agreements, cartels, syndicates, and concerns. Today, these organizations 
still continue to develop and evolve. The economic organization of socialism 
is also in accord with this rule. Economic system reform and horizontal 
combinations have resulted in a great liberation of China's productive 
forces. Industrial development is now being reorganized along the lines of 
specialization, collaboration and alliance-formation. Thus, the production 
of a new type of enterprise group fully complies with the laws of economic 
development. (Sun 1987: 4)
Proponents of the large enterprise strategy looked to advanced capital-
ist countries for inspiration, but the 'laws of economic development' they 
induced from their Marxist reading of economic history are strikingly 
dissimilar from the 'laws' then on offer in much of the capitalist world. 
At the same time that policymakers in Thatcher's Britain and Reagan's 
America were intent on dragging government out of the marketplace 
in an effort to recover a (perhaps mythic) era of free competition, these 
senior Chinese ofﬁcials had a very different causal story guiding their 
interventions. To them, capitalism's triumphs had come not from the 
ﬂourishing of free competition but rather from its subsequent extin-
guishment by the advance of big business. 
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If economic history offered the conclusion that large enterprises were 
at once the inevitable and desirable products of economic development, 
the example set by large enterprises in Asia's developmental states 
provided Chinese policymakers with ready models and benchmarks 
with which to guide their own use of industrial policy to hasten the 
process of large enterprise formation and development. The assembled 
documents show that ofﬁcials carefully studied a number of Asian 
countries' experience with large enterprise groups. One issue of Jingji 
Yanjiu Cankao Ziliao, published in August 1995, compared the experience 
of various Asian countries' with large enterprise groups at close range 
and presented policy-relevant conclusions for China. 
In these studies, Japan's experience was a particularly important ref-
erence point. A number of them present the view that Japan's post-war 
development had been led, to large degree, by its six large enterprise 
groups (Li 1989; Xü 1989). One article argued, on the basis of the Japa-
nese case, that increasing industrial concentration resulting from large 
enterprise development need not lead to 'stagnation' (tingzhi 停滞) or 
'decadence' (fuxiu 腐朽). The writer argued that 'the formation and 
development of enterprise groups in Japan involved the reassembly 
of monopoly capital in accordance with the objective requirements of 
large-scale socialized production' (Kang 1989: 9). And, by 'adjusting the 
relations of production, so as to better adapt to the objective needs of 
the development of social productive forces,' these enterprise groups 
'played a huge role in promoting economic development in post-war 
Japan' (ibid). Instead of becoming leeches on the state, the author argued, 
Japan's kereitsu remained faithful servants to the cause of economic 
development: they helped the government maintain 'macro control' of 
the economy in the high-growth period; intensiﬁed competition in both 
domestic and international markets; and stimulated rapid increases in 
investment and exports (Kang 1989: 9-11).
Ofﬁcials also hoped that the formation of large enterprise groups 
would help to alleviate some nagging problems of socialism with Chi-
nese characteristics. They expressed optimism that the large enterprise 
strategy would reduce high levels of fragmentation in key industries, a 
legacy of the 'large and complete, small and complete' (da er quan, xiao 
er quan 大而全，小而全) structure of the command economy. One piece, 
written by SCRES ofﬁcials in 1987, lamented the 'irrational' structure 
of the auto industry in which there were 100 auto factories and 2,000 
spare parts production companies nationwide (Yin and Jia 1987: 4). The 
authors argued in favour of bringing this productive capacity under 
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control of the three largest automakers then being added to the jihua 
danlie system. Relatedly, as a consequence of the typically small scale 
of enterprises in many domains of China's cellular industry, unrealized 
economies of scale were common, a problem that ofﬁcials hoped the 
expansion of enterprise groups would rectify (e.g. Zhang and Liang 
1995; Liu 1996).
Key Elements of a Market-conforming Model of State 
Control 
This collection of internal documents also sheds light on conceptual links 
between the large enterprise strategy and ofﬁcials' broader concerns 
about how the Party–state could best maintain control of a liberalizing 
economy. As Heilmann and Shih (2013: 21) have argued, the study of 
Chinese economic reform outside of China has often been framed by 
a distorting 'plan to market narrative' that has served to obscure the 
signiﬁcance of inﬂuential policymakers' deeply held and widely shared 
beliefs in 'active governmental guidance of the economy.' The 1990s were 
witness to a slew of sweeping marketizing initiatives, yet it is profoundly 
misleading to characterize this complex process as simply a triumph 
of market over plan. At the same time that these reforms were being 
rolled out, senior policymakers were engaged in vigorous discussion 
and planning for establishment of a market-conforming model of state 
control in an open economy. And large enterprise groups, particularly 
the 'pilot' enterprises, had pride of place in these plans.
A recurring theme in these documents is the emphasis placed on large 
enterprises as key instruments of state control in a rapidly changing 
marketplace. In the ﬁrst phase of the large enterprise strategy, the prior-
ity on state control was explicit and heavy handed. Early experiments 
were bound by the 'three no changes principle' (san bu bian yuanze三不
变原则): relationships of formal subordination would not change (lishu 
guanxi bu bian隶属关系不变), the ﬁnancial system would not change 
(caizheng tizhi bu bian财政体制不变) and the form of ownership (i.e. state 
ownership) would not change (suoyouzhi xingshi bu bian所有制形式不变) 
(Zhou 1995: 2). After the formal designation of China as a socialist market 
economy at the 14th Party Congress in 1992, the stricture on maintain-
ing absolute state ownership of large enterprises was relaxed and SOEs 
were encouraged to restructure as shareholding companies. A number 
of high-proﬁle share offerings on overseas stock markets in this period 
seemed to signal a commitment to gradual privatization of state assets. 
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Yet, close witnesses to the process argue that while senior policymakers 
certainly hoped that exposure to the stock market would invigorate SOEs 
and compel them to adapt to the rules of the market economy, there was 
never an intention to cede control of these national champions to private 
or foreign investors (Walter and Howie 2010, 2006). 
Amidst these reforms in the early 1990s, policymakers increasingly 
looked to another Asian state for guidance in the ways of achieving 
meaningful 'government–enterprise separation' (zhengqi fenkai政企分
开) alongside continued ﬁrm state control of the economy. In an inter-
nal document detailing myriad problems with large enterprise groups 
stemming from continued government meddling in enterprise affairs, 
analysts from the China Merchants Group argued that Singapore held 
ready lessons for China: 
At the moment, there is much discussion of how to achieve government–
enterprise separation with SOEs as the main entities in the management 
system of enterprise groups…In this regard, there is a lot we can learn 
from Singapore's experience. Singapore's state-owned enterprise economy 
occupies an important position in the national economy, and is known 
throughout the world to operate effectively. Its success is evident in the 
separation between management of state assets and enterprise operations, 
that is, government–enterprise separation. Singapore's state-owned economy 
is largely based on the government's establishment of four large holding 
companies as the core and with enterprise groups composed of government-
linked companies. (Zhang and Liang 1995: 20-21)
In the years since, policymakers have drawn inspiration from both 
elements of the Singapore model—the commanding position of the state 
economy and the approach to government–enterprise separation. In 
ongoing debate over China's evolving approach to state asset manage-
ment, there has been frequent reference to Singapore as there has been 
in discussions of how China can foster a ﬂeet of state-owned national 
champions (Eaton 2011).  
Policymakers also expressed the view that the development of large 
enterprise groups would aid the central government's efforts to replace 
the traditional planning system with a market-conforming 'macro-con-
trol' system overseen by the SPC (cf. Heilmann and Shih 2013: 7). An 
SPC ofﬁcial described the objective of this system transformation as: 'the 
state regulates (tiaokong调控) the market, the market guides (yindao引
导) the enterprise' (Xing 1988: 17). As the planning apparatus retracted 
its tentacles from the chain of production and shifted towards regulat-
ing the market, insiders argued that large enterprise groups would 
be an important lynchpin of state control in the revamped system. In 
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particular, the gradual replacement of fragmented market structures 
populated by thousands of small players with industries dominated by 
a small number of large enterprise groups would signiﬁcantly improve 
the effectiveness of government regulation of the economy (Kang 1989; 
Zhou 1995; Chen 1995).
Similar reasoning was applied to discussion about the exercise of 
state control in a trimmed-down state sector. In policy debate about the 
appropriate domain of the 'state-owned economy' (guoyou jingji国有经
济) that began in earnest in the mid-1990s, large enterprise groups again 
featured prominently in the policy discussion. At the same time that 
non-state enterprises established a ﬁrm footing in many industries, the 
central government began to consider how the state economy could con-
tinue to exercise a 'leading force' (zhudao liliang主导力量) in the economy, 
a role mandated by the PRC's constitution.3 A 1994 internal report by 
researchers in the State Council noted that, at the time, there were two 
views on what 'leading force' actually meant: one camp argued that the 
state need only control certain key sectors of the economy in order to 
provide a 'leading force', while others thought that the state would have 
to retain control of a large proportion of the entire economy in order to 
meaningfully fulﬁl this role (Guowuyuan Yanjiushi Ketizu 1994: 27). 
At the time, the State Council report endorsed the latter view, though 
senior policymakers subsequently leaned toward the former, command-
ing heights view at the 15th Party Congress (1997). The state's plan for 
'adjusting the layout of the state-owned economy' outlined at the 15th 
Party Congress stated that the state need only retain a ﬁrm 'controlling 
force' (kongzhili控制力) in 'lifeline industries' (mingmai hangye命脉行业) 
and 'critical areas' (guanjian lingyu关键领域). In the ensuing discussion 
about how the state ought to enhance its controlling force in priority in-
dustries, the development and expansion of state-owned large enterprises 
was described as an important method. One internal report suggested 
that, as large state-owned business groups increased in size, they would 
ultimately come to control the domestic market and play a vanguard role 
in Chinese enterprises' expansion into global markets (Sheng 1997: 3). 
Safeguards and Vanguards in Global Competition 
In the context of China's gradual opening to the global market, large 
enterprise groups were also depicted as a means of mitigating the at-
tendant risks of liberalization at home and reaping new opportunities 
abroad. China's General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade re-entry ne-
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gotiations began in the mid-1980s, but the phase of deep liberalization 
dates to 1995 when the leadership signalled its commitment to a course 
of tariff reductions and relaxation of foreign investment rules to support 
its bid to join the World Trade Organization (WTO). The ﬁnal WTO Ac-
cession Agreement included unprecedented concessions in agriculture 
and ﬁnance, among other sectors. Yet, behind this outward display of 
commitment to principles of open, liberal economics, there was much 
internal discussion about how the state should adapt to openness.
In these uncertain times, large enterprises were described in some 
internal documents as providing a line of defence against foreign en-
croachment in the home market. The 1994 State Council report on the 
state-owned economy mentioned above, noted that one of the rationales 
for supporting the development of large SOEs was China's increased 
vulnerability to foreign control of the economy due to the frailty of the 
non-state sector: 'In the context of a high degree of economic openness, 
in which market competition is intense and the private sector is weak, 
large state-owned enterprise groups should be established to safeguard 
the interests of the nation' (Guowuyuan Yanjiushi Ketizu 1994: 27). The 
documents also reﬂect a preoccupation with the state sector's 'getting 
big and getting strong' (zuo da zuo qiang做大做强) in order to ward off 
the advances of foreign multinationals. A 1996 report by an ofﬁcial with 
the State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC) made the case with 
reference to the civil aviation industry:
As China's economy is gradually linked to the international economy, 
there will be more and more foreign companies and large corporations in 
the domestic market. This means that the domestic market will become 
even more a part of the international market, such that enterprise groups 
that stay within the domestic market will be in direct contest with foreign 
companies and large corporations. Objectively speaking, compared to the 
strength of large foreign companies and corporations from abroad, we 
are at a considerable distance. The total number of aircraft of our three 
airline groups—Air China, China Eastern and China Southern—is less than 
America's ninth largest airline, Southwest Airlines. The combined assets of 
our four aircraft manufacturing enterprise groups—AVIC Xi'an Industry 
Aircraft Group, Shanghai Aviation Industrial Group, AVIC South Aviation 
Industry Group and Guizhou Aviation Industrial Group—is less than 50% 
of the total assets of America's McDonnell Douglas. In the face of these 
powerful competitors, we must quickly adjust the organizational structure 
of enterprises; encourage competition; promote alliances and mergers; and 
make some strong enterprises that are in line with the country's industrial 
policy grow rapidly stronger. (Liu 1996: 2)
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Policymakers' concern with increasing the domestic market share of 
the 'Big Three' airlines provided the rationale for a state-led consolida-
tion of the airlines market in the early 2000s (Eaton 2013).
In addition to 'safeguarding the interests of the nation' in the domestic 
market, policymakers expressed hope that state-owned large enterprises 
would lead the charge into the global marketplace. It was in the context 
of China's international trade negotiations that proponents of the large 
enterprise strategy began referring to the trial enterprises as the 'national 
team' (guojia dui国际队). In a 1997 speech, Vice Premier Wu Bangguo 
made the case in stark terms: 'If we could have ten or twelve internation-
ally competitive large enterprises we wouldn't just be a “big” economy, 
we could become a “strong” economy; we could take our rightful place 
in the international economy' (Jin yi bu 1997: 1). Some documents even 
suggest that large enterprises ought to engage in Art of War style tactics 
in order to enhance their own position and undercut that of their com-
petitors. In a 1995 speech addressing the challenges faced by the 'pilot' 
large enterprise groups in a liberalizing economy, Cheng Qingtai, a 
leading ofﬁcial of the large enterprise trials advised: 'We must not limit 
alliance formations to domestic enterprises; we should also make use 
of conﬂicting interests between international competitors and establish 
alliances with the competitors of our competitors; we must also consider 
attacking (chuji出击) international markets and a number of new market 
areas, such as third world markets.' (Chen 1995: 6)   
Weighing the Beneﬁts of Monopoly
One of the most interesting aspects of this collection of internal docu-
ments is the focus on weighing the pros and cons of monopoly. As 
discussed previously, a number of analysts argued, in Marxian terms, 
that monopolies were a natural outgrowth of capitalist development. 
Moreover, many contributors argued that under the right circumstances, 
as in post-war Japan, such monopolies could be effectively harnessed 
to the cause of driving national development. Yet, concerns about the 
downside of monopoly, expressed in the language of the liberal tradition 
of political economy, were also voiced at the time. Many of these wor-
ries bear striking resemblance to criticisms of actual business practices 
in the 'monopoly industries' (longduan hangye垄断行业) that have ﬁlled 
the mainland press in recent years. 
These documents lend insight into the theoretical underpinnings of 
Chinese ofﬁcials' support for the establishment of state-owned monopo-
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lies and oligopolies. One early piece, written by a researcher from the 
Tianjin branch of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) argued 
that the large enterprise strategy would naturally lead to monopoly:
Regardless of whether combinations take place within relatively loose 
enterprise groups, or within comparatively close-knit enterprise groups, 
the interests of the enterprise groups will drive expansion of their scale and 
increasingly high levels of concentration. Once a certain level is reached, this 
process will produce monopoly. As Li Ning pointed out: 'Once concentration 
develops to a certain level, one can say that monopoly will result as a matter 
of course.' The economy produces concentration and, past a certain point, 
concentration causes monopoly. This is a law of commodity economies. 
(Sun 1987: 31)  
While many writers acknowledge the dangers of monopoly, some 
have argued that monopoly and competition are not, in fact, antitheti-
cal. One internal document argued:
Although enterprise groups do have monopoly characteristics, this does not 
mean that the existence of enterprise groups will stiﬂe competition. In actual 
fact, just as enterprise groups have monopolistic features, due to, inter alia, 
the constant development of the economy as well as the internal structure of 
enterprise groups, they also have characteristics of competition. Enterprise 
groups are the unity of monopoly and competition. (Chen 1993: 20) 
These 'characteristics of competition' include competition between 
enterprise groups; competition between enterprise groups and con-
ventional enterprises; and competition between enterprises within the 
group (Chen 1993: 20-21). The ideas expressed in these articles offer 
a striking contrast to the familiar, neoclassical view of monopolies as 
aberrant departures from perfect competition to be remedied with such 
measures as deregulation and competition law. These documents reﬂect 
an eclectic view of monopoly, which combined Marxist and institution-
alist scholars' views of the inevitability of monopoly capitalism with 
developmentalist perspectives on the beneﬁts of monopolistic large 
enterprises for national development.                               
Yet such views were not held by all. Others looking into the future 
argued that the government ought to develop means of preventing 
monopoly in industries home to large enterprises. Then a newly-minted 
PhD from CASS and now vice chairman of the China Insurance Regula-
tory Commission, Chen Wenhui argued in a neibu journal in 1993 that 
although establishment of large enterprise groups could bring about 
economies of scale in industry as well as a more specialized division of 
labour, monopoly threatened to stymie these beneﬁts. He characterized 
identiﬁcation of the appropriate means of preventing monopoly as 'an 
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important research topic' (Chen 1993: 25). Chen also expressed concern 
about the capacity of China's institutional environment to effectively 
constrain large enterprise groups from devolving into cronyism. Noting 
that large enterprise groups ought to be independent and self-ﬁnancing, 
he argued that most of China's 55 pilot enterprises remained deeply, and 
problematically, entwined with government; one such pilot enterprise, 
the Heilongjiang Forest Industry Enterprise Group, was said to retain 
its own court system as well as its own forest police (Chen 1993: 22). In 
such 'administrative monopolies' (xingzheng longduan行政垄断), market 
competition was, in reality, a rigged 'game' in which government abused 
its dual role as both player and referee (ibid). The reasoning is strikingly 
similar to recent arguments for 'breaking monopoly' (dapo longduan打
破垄断) made by 'New Right' economists such as Zhang Weiying (e.g. 
Zhang 2006). 
The focus of this article is on ideas, but it is worth noting that these 
documents also have much to reveal about senior policymakers' views 
on practical matters of implementation, organization and bureaucracy. 
Throughout, one ﬁnds echoes of Chen's scepticism about the capacity 
of the Chinese state to effectively guide large enterprise groups. One 
particularly unvarnished piece, written by a State Planning Commission 
ofﬁcial in 1996, argued that large enterprise group experimentation was 
beset by a serious lack of coordination:
Why develop large enterprise groups? Policymakers (juececeng决策层), 
government departments and enterprises have understandings of this 
issue that are probably not entirely consistent. The aim of policymakers 
in the formation and development of enterprise groups is to improve the 
international competitiveness of our businesses and the economy. In the 
circumstances of China's continuous opening to the international economy, 
the aim is to make China's economy and industry able to survive, develop 
and, in the context of a ﬁercely competitive international market, secure an 
invincible position…But when these aims and background considerations 
arrive at the government departments and regions, they turn into a kind of 
assignment: they want to establish several or dozens of enterprise groups, 
not solve the problem of how to improve competitiveness. And at the 
enterprise level, they strive to be included in an enterprise group because 
after being included they can become a discrete planning unit and will have 
many conveniences (such as decisionmaking power) and beneﬁts (such as 
status, a higher administrative rank and preferential policies). Very few, 
basically none, of these enterprises consider that the purpose of developing 
large groups is to avoid the risk of operating losses; stabilize market share, 
and; increase domestic and international competitiveness in production 
and business sales, domestic and international competitiveness. Because 
of variance in these aims, the experiment in establishing and developing 
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enterprise groups is unsatisfactory, and there is even no way for them to 
carry things out or develop. (Jiang 1996: 11)
Others pointed out that while increasing industrial concentration 
did seem to be a feature of capitalist development and, thus, bound to 
emerge in China, the gradual, market-driven nature of the 'centralization 
of capital' in countries with a long history of capitalism was fundamen-
tally unlike China's heavy-handed, administrative approach. One par-
ticularly controversial method of forming enterprises groups in China 
was so-called 'arranged marriages' (lalangpei拉郎配), in which govern-
ment played the role of matchmaker between stronger and weaker 
enterprises, the results of which were often less than glowing (Zhang 
and Liang 1995: 16). In the manner described above, such matchmaking 
was often driven more by bureaucrats' interests in satisfying demands 
from on high than by objective considerations of the economic value 
of these pairings. 
Conclusion
In shedding light on the ideational foundations of Chinese policymakers' 
embrace of the large enterprise group strategy in the ﬁrst two decades 
of the reform period, the assembled documents offer insight into why 
Chinese policymakers chose this path. First, policymakers drew eclecti-
cally from the annals of economic history in forming the conclusion that 
mounting industrial policy in support of large enterprise group develop-
ment could, if done well, accelerate China's economic development. From 
Marxian economics they learned that choosing a capitalist road, even one 
with Chinese characteristics, would lead inexorably towards monopoly. 
From the East Asian developmental states they learned that this was not 
necessarily a bad thing; the example set by Japan, in particular, seemed 
to suggest that judicious state guidance of the process of 'centralization 
of capital' could effectively steer enterprises away from cronyism and 
indolence and towards meeting national development objectives. 
But the promised beneﬁts of developing state-owned large enter-
prise groups were not deﬁned purely in economic terms. The 'gradual 
encroachment' of this idea also clearly had a political dimension. In the 
context of a rapidly growing non-state sector and a teetering state sector, 
policymakers thought of state-owned large enterprises as key elements 
of the market-conforming model of state control they began to envision 
and work towards beginning from the late 1980s. While there was un-
doubtedly an element of Marxist-Leninist correctness behind internal 
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debate about how the state could continue to exercise its constitutionally 
mandated 'leading role' in a liberalizing economy, the fears informing 
this debate seem to have been quite real. Indeed, the challenge facing 
them was immense: just how does a communist ruling party 'ride the 
tiger' of a marketizing economy? The blueprints in this category were 
truly few and this helps to explain why, despite the vast differences 
between the two countries, Singapore emerged as an important model 
for Chinese policymakers' efforts to transform themselves into market-
embracing communist authoritarians while staying on the tiger's back. 
This article is not concerned with current affairs but, arguably, its 
content is helpful to making sense of important developments in recent 
years. As the other contributions to this volume attest, the 'advancing 
state' (guojin国进) has become a mainstay of debate among Chinese 
intellectuals and within government since the global ﬁnancial crisis. 
Strikingly, many of the protagonists in the events linked to guojin, cen-
tral SOEs, were part of the national team of pilot enterprises nurtured 
by the central government in the 1990s. While references to the large 
enterprise strategy within Chinese ofﬁcialdom petered out in the late 
1990s—partly because Li Peng was replaced by Zhu Rongji and partly 
because the Asian Financial Crisis had tarnished the image of Asian 
business groups—one ﬁnds a high degree of ideational continuity 
in current discussions about state sector development. For example, 
under the leadership of Li Rongrong, inaugural director of the central-
level State Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission 
(SASAC), mergers between central SOEs were ﬁrmly encouraged, and 
sometimes outright demanded by SASAC, in the name of SOEs 'going 
big and going strong' (zuo da zuo qiang做大做强). 
Yet, while the policies are similar, this is not simply a story of conti-
nuity. In comparison to ofﬁcial views from earlier decades examined 
here, there is now much less consensus that such interventions are, in 
fact, appropriate and legitimate. In pockets of Chinese ofﬁcialdom as 
well as among prominent scholars, ideas about the appropriate role of 
government in the economy are regularly framed in the language of 
neoclassical economics and, often, in neoliberal terms. Indeed, argu-
ments for 'breaking monopoly' (dapo longduan打破垄断), which have 
ﬁlled the pages of such pro-market periodicals as The Economic Observer 
(jingji guancha bao 经济观察报) in recent years, are miles from the eclectic 
state socialist ideas that informed the large enterprise strategy. Indeed, 
many such pieces assume that the rightful path forward—i.e. more 
liberalization, less industrial policy— is self-evident and the only thing 
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holding current practice in place is powerful interests in the state sector 
(e.g. Zhang 2006). Along these lines, renowned policy economist Wu 
Jinglian (2009) argued in a widely read Caijing op-ed that 'pushing the 
reform of the state-owned monopolies and that of the political system 
means that the government will have to reform itself. Consequently, 
reform has entered a more difﬁcult battle and progress has slowed sig-
niﬁcantly.' In the coming years, high-stakes policy choices in the state 
sector will certainly be shaped by powerful interests, but the contest 
will also be over ideas.
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NOTES
1  The Jingji Yanjiu Cankao Ziliao series of documents covers 1985 to 1997. The Neibu 
Wengao documents are from 1993 to 1999. Gaige Neican documents cover 1994 to 
2002. 
2  The following two paragraphs draw from Eaton (2013): 66-70.
3  Chapter 1, Article 7 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China reads: 'The state 
economy is the sector of socialist economy under ownership by the whole people; 
it is the leading force in the national economy. The state ensures the consolidation 
and development of the state economy.'
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